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A L P H A  60: What is your religion? 
LEMMY: I believe in the immediate inspirations of my conscience. 
ALPHA 60: Is there a difference between the mystery of the laws of knowledge and those 
of love? 
LEMMY: In my opinion, there is no mystery in love. 
ALPHA 60: You are not telling the truth. 
LEMMY: I don't understand. 
ALPHA 60: You're hiding certain things.. .though I don't know yet what they are. So.. .for 
the time being.. .you are free. 
"Doing one better than virgin birth," writes Susan Buck-Morss, "modern man, homo 
autotelus, literally produces himself 'miraculously out of [his] own substance'. . . . The 
theme of the autonomous, autotelic subject as sense-dead, and for this reason a manly cre- 
ator, a self-starter, sublimely self-contained, appears throughout the nineteenth century."' 
The myth of autogenesis is a transparency of limitless reason - a Sadeian dream of sover- 
eignty with the smart bomb as post-modernity's "flesh of my flesh." For, from the eigh- 
teenth century forward, "his own substance" is unthinkable apart from technology. Evelyn 
Fox Keller has argued that the "perennial motif" underlying much of scientific creativity 
is "the urge to fathom the secrets of nature, and the collateral hope that [in doing so] we 
will fathom the ultimate secrets (and hence gain control) of our own mortality." But there 
are two sides to this quest evident throughout the history of science: "the search for the 
wellspring of life, and, simultaneously, for ever more effective instruments of death.'I2 
And yet intricated with this autogenic "impulse" of modernity is the demand for freedom 
which echoes throughout Western institutions and rights discourses: autonomy. I t  is 
therefore dangerous to conflate autogenesis as instrumental rationality with autonomy as 
critique; for, the former enchains historical self-creation in a meanslends ratio, while the 
latter looks to history for the possibility of human beings to become ends in them~elves.~ 
Additionally, philosophical idealism and social objectification are not inimical, but work 
hand in hand. Thus, they not only obscure the relation between experience and meaning, 
but expand the gap that exists between them. As Horkheimer articulates, "the conceptual 
apparatus determines the senses, even before perception occurs; apriori, the citizen sees 
the world as the matter from which he himself manufactures it."4 
The tension between autotelic subjectivity as the marriage of technology and meta- 
physics and autonomy as critique defines modernity, and clearly in the history of moder- 
nity this tension is lived through and suffered by people differently, according to their 
race, class, and gender. In modernity's ideological equivalence of women, the colonized, 
and the under- and working-classes with nature andlor immaturity, their "otherness" is at 
once manufactured (as the material of subjugation) and obscured as such through rational- 
izing discourses of science (natural and human), law and aesthetics. In the two hundred 
years since the promise of 1789, these "others" have at different moments stood as a type 
of camera obscura, their suffering, unfreedom, and resistance inverting the horizon of the 
bourgeois dream of (universal) self-creation. In their "otherized" suffering, they confront 
the sense-dead morality of modernity with a demand for an ethical relation that does not 
misrecognize their subjugation as universal freedom. And, importantly, this inversion is 
also the scene of the autotelic subject's misrecognition of its own freedom. 
Provoked by the particular (ir)relation of womanlautonomy are numerous questions 
surrounding experience, sentience, death, technology, and freedom. If the bourgeois sub- 
ject is articulated in terms of self-creation and self-direction, how is sentience understood? 
What configurations do the circuits of affect take in modernity's move from aisthitikos 
(that which is perceptive by feeling) to aesthetics as an autonomous institution of art 
forms, i.e., the Kantian formalization of aesthetic experience? In the synaesthetic reconsti- 
tution of the senses that is the space-time of cinema, how does "the feminine" come to be 
configured at once as a conduit between the senses and the scene of occultation which 
drives the overdetermination of vision? To what degree, then, is female subjectivity in 
modernity an optical illusion? And, finally, what's love got to do with it? If in modernity 
love is figured through the scene of occultation, does it not both promise and foreclose 
any possibility of women's autonomy? 
In order to get at some of these questions, I will follow the nineteenth-century devel- 
opment of what I will call the "cinematicity" of the feminine: an erotically charged 
specular invention dependent upon technological reproducibility and circuited through 
modernity's delineation of woman. The erotic affect of this cinematicity is produced 
through the tension between narrativity and fetishism; in other words, the forms or stag- 
ings (mise en sdne) of desire produced through the movement of images in time and the 
stilling or petrification of such images. Fetishization and aesthetisization become heavily 
intricated in the nineteenth century, strewn as that era is with representations of prosti- 
tute-bodies, bodies which are seen to hold a secret in their very "nature" as living com- 
modities. Secret, too, is the "sublime machine" of the female hysteric which the French 
neurologist, J.M. Charcot was so determined to penetrate with serialized photography. 
And, with the invention of the female android or automaton, spectacularized in Villiers de 
1'Isle-Adam's novel L'Eve Future as the ultimate cinematic prosthesis, all secrets (of life 
and death) were to be revealed. The affect secreted through the cinematicity of the femi- 
nine, from the prostitute to the hysteric and the female android, in the era of homo 
autotelus, creates a number of conundrums for thinking about any possibility of women's 
autonomy. I am not attempting to write the "experience" of prostitutes or hysterics, for 
to do so would be to write another bachelor(ette) machine. I want, rather, to question the 
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techniques deployed in the occultation of those very secrets that optical devices were 
invented to reveal. 
The prostitute, hysteric, and female android were invented through an intersection of 
scientific/medical, legal, and aesthetic discourses, with the issue of visuality and the 
employment of optical technologies being central. Sight was the only viable (i.e., some- 
what trustworthy) sense for the Enlightenment, for the apriori of the concept means that 
it is served by the eye and its extensions. Hence, sight is viable only insofar as it is always 
mediated by those representations produced according to reason. In other words, the 
privileging of sight resulted in its disembodiment - and its alienation. And, in its disem- 
bodiment, it was able to penetrate and to reveal secrets (of life and death, nature and mor- 
tality, the natural and the unnatural) - to go where no man had gone before. 
The separation of the senses in the nineteenth century meant an "unloosening of the 
eye from the network of referentiality incarnated in tactility and its subjective relation to 
perceived   pace."^ Jonathan Crary astutely names this remapping of the senses "the auton- 
omization of sight." It is important to note here that the new observer "fitted for the tasks 
of 'spectacular' consumption" coincides with Kant's argument for moral being as sense- 
dead and, thus, the rationalization of the aesthetic. And, of course, with the creation of 
this modern observer new objects of vision are produced which "assume a mystified and 
abstract identityn6 - in other words, these new objects, of which "woman" is central, 
assume the status of concepts. But in all of this, what happens to sentience? Is it simply 
repressed? Or is it also reinvented? Does sentience become one of these distant, remote 
empiricities? Buck-Morss suggests the following: 
The truly autogenic being is entirely self-contained. If it has any body at all, it must be one 
impervious to the senses, hence safe from external control. Its potency is in its lack of corporeal 
response. In abandoning the senses, it, of course, gives up sex. Curiously, it is precisely in this 
castrated form that the being is gendered male - as if, having nothing so embarrassingly 
unpredictable or rationally uncontrollable as the sense-sensitive penis, it can then confidently 
claim to be the phallus. Such an asensual, anaesthetic protuberance is this artifact: modern 
man.' 
But, modern man does not so much "abandon the senses" or 'give up sex": he relin- 
quishes the "burden" of feeling and of sex onto woman through the aesthetisization of 
aesthetikos - the rationalization of the aesthetic. Thus mediated by reason's representa- 
tion, the aesthetic is then internalized (as fantasy or fetish) through Einfiihlung (empathy 
or sympathy; the capacity tofeel something for someone or thing). This internalized 
projection: 
onto women passing by, as onto commodities in store windows, entails not the loss of self, but 
the incorporation of the world (women, things) as fantasy images within one's own day-dreams 
(then losing oneself in them). . . . Benjamin describes Einfiihlzng as "the unlimited tendency to 
represent the position of everyone else, every animal, every dead thing in the co~mos."~ 
It  is possible, then, to see the Einfiihlung of autonomous subjectivity as a recuperative 
gesture, an attempt to gather up all that in the bourgeois era is no longer ontologically 
guaranteed. 
ALPHA 6 0  : I will calculate.. . so that failure.. . is impossible. 
LEMMY: I'll fight until failure does become possible. 
ALPHA 6 0 :  Everything I plan will be accomplished. 
LEMMY: That's not certain. I too have a secret. 
From the first drawings of the female skeleton in the 1750s to de I'Isle-Adam's Charcot's 
Attitudes Pussionnelles to Villiers' L'Eve future to M61i2s1 magical cinema, modernity's tech- 
nological investment in the visible truth of sexual difference is connected to two other 
realms of obsessive interest: nature and technology itself. The dedicated interest given to 
women by medical science and technology during the Enlightenment was driven by the 
political question of "natural rights." Condorcet had, after all, specifically included 
women in his argument for universal rights; but this claim could not dispel the earlier 
question arising out of natural law: "Does natural law submit women to men?" Hence, 
the problem of women's place, value, function, and meaning in the public sphere was a 
problem given to science to determine.9 This initiation into modernity, circumscribed as 
it is by science, produces woman as discourse on the one hand, and invention on the other. 
The biological delineation of sex difference as incommensurable provided the social delin- 
eation between the private and public realms with greater clarity. The bodily inscriptions 
of this incommensurability were then to ensure the subjugation of women in the private 
world to the laws of the "fraternal" state; ensuring as well that "women's politics must be 
the politics of morality."'0 
The delineations and inscriptions of sexual difference - or, more pointedly, given the 
issue of incommensurability, sexual division - marked the unattached "public woman" 
with a sign of criminality andlor pathology, because her presence in the public realm 
served to indicate the historical, rather than "naturally ensured," division between private 
and public life. This disturbance in the order of things was understood as an effect of her 
impropriety (both in terms of property relations and moral codes) andlor her unnatural1 
pathological status. The "impropriety" of the public woman both revealed and reflected 
the contradictions underpinning the modern polis, for not only was she evidence of the 
Enlightenment gone awry, she also embodied the disintegration of idealized love and 
beauty. No longer the auratic tie to universal values, love is materialized and the feminine 
becomes the cipher of death. 
[Slince Buchner, the body's finitude, its characteristic ontological corruptibility and the 
aesthetic of fragmentation it induces, is crystallized in prostitution.. .the woman's body, 
deprived of its maternal-body, becomes desirable only in its passage to the limit: as death-body, 
fragmented-body, petrified-body.'' 
The illusory status of man's autonomy is brought into stark relief with the rise of pros- 
titution, for the prostitute "conjoins private morality and a social ethic.. . her sensuality in 
the private realm finds expression in the public realm.. . ."l2 Thus, the prostitute's activity 
exposes the hypocrisy of a social ethic whose underlying tenet is greed and domination, an 
hypocrisy which, by extension, underpins the bourgeois household. In effect, the prosti- 
tute-body can be seen as confronting the bourgeoisie with the realization of the degree to 
which human relations have become commodified relations. This form of exchange precip- 
itates a further crisis of identity: the prostitute is not a "true commodity" (i.e., the object is 
not identical to itself because the prostitute's subjectivity is not exchanged) and hence can- 

not affirm the autonomy of the client's subjectivity, or she affirms only his subjectivity as 
consumer. To desire the fashionable, purchasable woman-as-thing is to desire exchange- 
value itself, that is, the very essence of capitalism.13 In this sense, the prostitute stands as a 
critique of autonomy, disturbing the autotelic insensitivity of the bourgeois subject. It is 
due to this critical bearing that the prostitute-body becomes, for many, an heroic icon, con- 
fronting bourgeois institutions and market relations by bearing the burden of autonomy 
(as "free agents") without the ideology which equates freedom with free market. 
This crisis of subjectlsubject and subjectlobject relations, the crisis of male autonomy 
and female subjugation, is rationalized through a dizzying labyrinth of legal and medical 
discourses constructed to ensure "difference" and, hence, immunity for the male subject. 
These discourses - antidotes to the evidence of commodified relations (which robs "man" 
of his humanity) which extends from the boulevards to the nuptial bed - placed any 
public woman under the sign of pathology and criminality. l4 The optical technologies of 
the period were crucial in the production and evaluation of the "evidence." As photogra- 
phy was now institutionalized in the form of taxonomic "portraits" for legal, anthropo- 
logical, and medical purposes, documentation was compiled and edited so as to prove 
the theory that such women were inherently and radically "different." The law put these 
images to use in the invention of the criminal body of the prostitute. Hence, the female 
body was entering the public sphere as image, its suffering erased and its secrets deci- 
phered, by way of technology. 
According to Baudelaire, the prostitute is the possessor of a secret, and a secret knowl- 
edge which can be denied or mystified, but not ignored. The discourses of the period 
were used to penetrate and reveal the prostitute's secret, with the same impulse as the 
"perennial motif that underlies much of scientific creativity - namely, the urge to fathom 
the secrets of nature, and the collateral hope that, in fathoming the secrets of nature, we 
will fathom the ultimate secrets (and hence gain control) of our own mortality."15 The 
iconicity of the prostitute-body functions as an image that, by its pretence to provide a 
"difference" from the repetitive sameness of industrial processes, not only legitimates that 
humiliating sameness, but also becomes, via industrialization itself, a fetish-object. Indus- 
trialization's success in surveillance and self-surveillance is able to provide the illusion of 
privacy, of escape from industrialization itself. As Benjamin wrote: "In an arcade, women 
are as in their boudoir." Because it is an illusion of escape - an image of difference - "it" 
(the public female body) becomes a fetish, a holder of the secret of freedom. This entan- 
gling of secrecy, love, freedom, and privacy is an optical and discursive invention which 
traverses another specifically "feminine" body: the hysteric. 
The link between impropriety and institutionalization includes not only "spectacles of 
vice" but also "spectacles offilie." The institutionalization of women had a great deal to 
do with issues of reproduction and the propriety of motherhood.16 Greater and greater 
medical interest was given to the uterus, the clitoris, and to their relationship. It  was dis- 
covered late in the eighteenth century that women need not have orgasms to conceive, 
thus permitting further delineation and inscription of the female body with forms of pro- 
priety: the orgasm's "superfluousness" to conception robs the woman of her clitoris and 
her uterus, rendering them the "property" of men and under the care of the state. Clearly, 
it is women's assertions of autonomy which the law seeks to punish: 
The asylum exchanges women by marking women's refusal to submit to traditional, socially 
accepted forms of exchange. It registers them for attempting to challenge the forms of expres- 
sion to which they had been assigned. The dossiers of the Salpetrisre swell with cases of women 
handed over by their husbands for flirting too much, of daughters turned over by fathers for 
refusing chosen mates, of mothers committed by sons for showing too much religious fervor." 
Once institutionalized, women became the special objects of experimentation and 
surveillance, the special extensions of the new technologies of the body, and the property 
of science. A new wing of the Salpetri2re clinic was built in order to house a photo- 
graphic laboratory and an increased number of patients. It  was here that J.M. Charcot 
composed his extensive collection of serialized photographs representing female hysterics 
in different stages of crisis. The compilation, entitled Attitudes Passionnelles, provides 
images meant to display the total collapse of meaning (the symbolic) into the materiality 
of the signifier; the images index the language of the body. Of course, this language is 
already spoken by the interpreter's symbolic order. Charcot is the lexicographer, compil- 
ing a vast dictionary of symptoms and their representations. The "portraits" compose a 
language from which a narrative is made. In the ordered iconography, patients move 
through stages of dementia to total ecstasy; and although the images are of different 
patients, they are composed in such a way as to make the women indistinguishable from 
each other - exchangeable medical objects. There exists, in this arrangement of "ever the 
same in countless number" (Benjamin's description of the commodity), a sense of narra- 
tive progression in time, and a fetishization through the repetition of iconic stillness. 
The narrativization of women's pathologies is underscored by the performance aspect of 
Charcot's work. Every Tuesday, Dr. Charcot would give a lecture-demonstration to his 
colleagues and students. Taking the form of a stage show, complete with floor lighting, 
Charcot would subject the patients to mechanical devices, apply the appropriate pressure 
to the appropriate zone, and voild, a "passionate attitude." 
Il argaait de ses fantastiqzles riussites expirimentales. . .pour affirmer une espzce de toute-pzlissance de 
I'hypnose: "C'est vraiment, dans tozlte sa simplicite: I'homme-machine rivipar de La Mettrie, qzle nozls 
avons sous les yezlx." - Je note qzle La Mettrie, qzlant 2 h i ,  ne chachait pas ceci, qzle si I'homme est zlne 
machine, alors les midecins seront les mahes: car La midecine sera seale 2 pouvoir "cbanger les esprits et 
les moezlrs avec le cwps." [embedded quotes taken from Charcot's writing]'' 
The invention of the hysteric as "sublime machine" in the nineteenth century is of par- 
ticular interest in relation to the questions of autogenesis and autonomous subjectivity. 
The performance of the theory of female pathology in the form of hysteria is the privilege 
of sense in the creation of nonsense, which is then scientifically observed through a gaze 
that is eroticized through its "decoding" of sublime secrets, "redeeming" that gaze into a 
symbolic order. But what specifically is being sought after in the delineation of these 
"passions"? Is hysteria not a dis-ease in the heart of conjugal love? Do the techniques 
deployed to cure the suffering of the hysteric translate the history of the pathology of 
family romance into a secret ontology of femininity, out of which emanates (from her own 
substance), for all to see, love disfigured by corporeality? In the serialized photographs, 
the particularity of the patient (her corporeality) is occultated, leaving a trace (the decor- 
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porealized secret) of her "being" visible only in the subsequent photograph. While the 
differences between portraits drive the narrative, the significance of this love story exists 
only through the "ever-the-same" of femininity. The photographic spectacle that is the 
hysteric can thus be seen as a type of bachelor machine. 
And there is no bachelor machine quite like Hadaly, Villiers de 1'Isle-Adam's anddde, 
the most captivating representation produced in the nineteenth century to offer the ideal 
release from degradation. First published in 1885 and written by Baudelaire's student and 
MallarmC's master, L'Eve faare, in its marriage of metaphysics and technology, fully 
inflects the technologization of the woman's body through institutions of social control 
with the fantasy of the conquest of nature - a procedure already at work in the nascent 
cinematicity of the hysteric and prostitute-body. 
Since our Gods and our aspirations are no longer anything but scientific, why shouldn't our 
loves be so, too? In place of that Eve of the forgotten legend, the legend despised and discred- 
ited by Science, I offer you a scientific Eve.. . . Far from being hostile to the love of men for 
their wives - who are so necessary to perpetuate the race (at least till a new order of things 
comes in), I propose to reinforce, ensure and guarantee that love. I will do so with the aid of 
thousands and thousands of facsimiles, who will render wholly superfluous all those beautiful 
but deceptive mistresses, ineffective henceforth forever.19 
So speaks the protagonist of L'Eve fatare, Thomas Alva Edison, "the man who made a 
prisoner of the echo." This "Sorcerer of Men10 Park," promises his audience an ultimate 
positivist fantasy: the production of new beings who "will function in a second nature, 
rendered more perfect by Science." Edison's friend, Lord Ewald, is suicidal over the non- 
perfectibility of the beautiful woman, Alicia, whom he loves. Her physical beauty is 
incommensurate with her "vile soul," for it has been "afflicted with reason." Edison's 
mission is to replace the mortal beloved with an equally beautiful cipher, an andre'de 
who "perfectly reflects man's desire,"20 and is, importantly, the bringing to life of art. 
Hadaly (which we are told means "ideal" in Arabic), is, Edison assures his friend, more 
real than the original, so much so that even Alicia's dog, endowed with a powerful sense 
of smell, will bark at the original and obey the Illusion. Edison's description of Hadaly's 
perfection is worth quoting at length for its astonishing prescience of what becomes the 
cinematicity of the feminine: 
I can capture the grace of her gesture, the fullness of her body, the fragrance of her flesh, the 
resonance of her voice, the turn of her waist, the light of her eyes, the quality of her movements 
and gestures, the individuality of her glance, all her traits and characteristics, down to the 
shadow she casts on the ground - her complete identity in a word. I shall be the murderer of 
her foolishness, the assassin of her triumphant animal nature.21 
This promise to "raise from the clay of Human Science as it now exists, a Being made 
in our image" is fulfilled: as Hadaly says to her new master, "Like a true woman, I will be 
for you only as you desire me,"22 and will not be if not desired. The creation of Hadaly is 
a "specifically phallocentric variant on the Frankenstein complexn2' - she is the bachelor 
machine par excellence. 
Villiers de 1'Isle-Adam's rendering is but a short stretch from the real Edison, the 
inventor of the phonograph whose ultimate aim was total representation, the synchroniza- 
tion of the image and sound. As Noel Birch observes: 
spectators overstep the narrow limits of their lives in a communion with "artists and musicians 
long since dead," projecting themselves into the latter's survival.. . . Edison's wish to link to his 
phonograph an apparatus capable of recording and reproducing pictures.. .is not just the ambi- 
tion of an astute captain of industry; it is also the pursuit of the fantasy of a class become the 
fantasy of a culture: to extend the "conquest of nature" by triumphing over death through an 
ersatz of Life itself.24 
This fantasy is also, and importantly, a male fantasy of autogenesis which is articu- 
lated to the fullest in Villiers de 1'Isle-Adam's novel. The removal of women from the 
place of reproduction is, after all, the ultimate technological fantasy of conquest. Yet, the 
central and obsessive concern in the novel is not just the "triumphing over death through 

an ersatz of Life itself," it is also absolutely necessary that this Eve of the future guarantee 
love. She is "nothing but the first hours of love, immobilized, the hour of the Ideal made 
the eternal prisoner"; and, as she contains "the souls of all other women," desire itself is 
forever sated.25 Hence, at work is a mesh of fears overcome; the fear of woman, nature, 
and technology itself - all of which are constructed as autonomous and other - are infused 
with love, that very love which has been mortified and banished by modernity's 
"progress." Edison's desire is, after all, to save his friend from the wretchedness of history, 
and he does so by first disposing of her corporeality. 
There are long sections of the novel dedicated to the mechanics of this invention, 
whose lungs are made of two gold phonographs, styluses poised in anticipation of 
inscribing the voice of Alicia, the beauty with a vile soul. The voice will then speak the 
words "invented by the greatest poets, the most subtle metaphysicians, the most pro- 
found novelists of this century.. . The synchronization of the movement of the lips 
with the grain of a voice is an obvious preface of the cinema to come; but the novel's 
"main content constitutes a marvellously apt metaphor for the imaginary operations of 
the future Institution [of ~inema)."~' This operation, similar to the act of Einfiihlung, 
involves losing oneself in those objects and images once they have been incorporated by 
the imaginary, thus allowing one to live, to feel through them. But, importantly, this is 
not a shedding of the ego, not a loss of self, for this experience of synaesthesia is pros- 
thetic. As Hadaly explains: "Who am I? A creature of dreams, who lives half awake in 
your thoughts, and whose shadow you may dissipate any time with one of those fine rea- 
sonable arguments which will leave you, in my place, nothing but vacancy, sorrow, 
heartache.. . ."28 Hadaly's utterance stages the jeu of death erotics which marks much of 
modernism, an aesthetic which bears the newly conjured face of the Sadeian hero who 
seeks to overcome his state of alienation by taking pleasure in, through conquest or pas- 
sivity, the inalienable right of death. 
The cinematicity of the feminine is not a claim for an essential moment which prede- 
termines and underlies all of cinema's fascination and eroticism. Rather, the development 
of the Institutional Mode of Representation intersects with, and absorbs within it, the his- 
toricity of the feminine as a circuitry of affect bound to narrative through the "fantasy of 
a class become the fantasy of a culture." The "universal man-machine" of the nineteenth 
century was "no longer seen as the testimony to the genius of mechanical invention: it 
rather becomes a night-mare, a threat to human life," and concomitantly, it becomes (with 
few exceptions) a woman. 
The aestbetisization of woman then operates to decipher what had become an unbearable 
burden of sentient experience - a desperate attempt to recircuit the nightmare. Through 
the remoteness of optical perception, the "loosening of the eye," which comes about in the 
rationalization of society and the creation of the new observer - the new objects of vision 
in mass society were made to stand in for, to mediate, the sensate world. Simultaneously, 
these "objects" become possessions and extensions of the sense-dead bourgeois self. And 
hence, in themselves, these "objects" do not exist. 
ALPHA 60 : For our misfortune, the world is a reality.. .and I..  .for m y  misfortune..  .I  a m  
myself - Alpha 60. 
LEMMY: Natasha..  . hurry . .  . hurry!. . . Natasha. .  . th ink of the  word love.. . 
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